Tag archives: shareholder democracy

Implications of the Collaborative Model of Corporate Governance

In a recent paper, Jill Fisch and Simone Sepe outline a new model for corporate governance: the Insider-Shareholder Collaborative model. A Shift Towards Collaboration Two models have previously dominated the corporate governance discourse: (i) the management-power model and (ii) the shareholder-power model. The former emphasizes a board’s decision-making authority as the corporation’s essential coordinating and … Continue reading

Federal government proposes changes to corporate law: What it means for corporate governance and shareholder activism

On September 28, 2016, Canada’s federal government introduced a bill proposing amendments (the Amendments) to the Canada Business Corporations Act (the CBCA), among other acts. The Amendments include new requirements for electing directors, mandatory diversity disclosure, and changes to shareholder communications. These proposed changes, if enacted, will have significant effects on corporate governance and shareholder … Continue reading

How corporate governance reforms spread

Recent research on the adoption of majority voting rules provides some insight on how corporate governance reforms are adopted and change company behaviour, and suggests that reforms may have the greatest impact on firms that are late to adopt them. The push for majority voting, which requires that directors receive a majority (rather than a … Continue reading

The CCGG makes a push for enhanced proxy access

The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG) recently released its much anticipated policy paper on “proxy access”, a term which refers to shareholders’ conceptual right  to nominate directors and have those nominees placed on management’s ballot. The CCGG takes the position that this right, which is supplemental to a shareholders right to elect directors, “is … Continue reading

Dual-Class Shares May Increase Value for Shareholders

A significant issue regarding the corporate governance of public companies arises from questions regarding the optimal role of shareholders in navigating a company’s direction.  The one share, one vote view of the world posits that shareholder democracy is best achieved when the division of control amongst shareholders holds true with the division of economic ownership.  … Continue reading
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