Tag archives: shareholder rights plan

Glass Lewis’ 2017 Canada policy guidelines

Towards the end of last year, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), a leading governance and proxy voting firm, released its 2017 Proxy Paper Guidelines for Canada (the Guidelines) for the upcoming 2017 proxy season.  Although the Guidelines contain changes compared to the guidelines released by Glass Lewis in 2016, most were foreshadowed in the 2016 guidelines so should come as no surprise.  The key changes are detailed below.

Director Overboarding

When making recommendations in relation to directors, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against (a) a director who is an executive of any public … Continue Reading

Glass Lewis Proxy Paper Guidelines: Updates for 2015

Yesterday, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis) released a new version of its Proxy Paper Guidelines (the Guidelines) (updated as of December 30, 2014), previously released on November 5, 2014.

Key changes in the 2015 Guidelines as compared to the 2014 Guidelines include:

1              Majority voting – Glass Lewis recommends that, for uncontrolled companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), shareholders withhold votes from all members of those companies’ governance committees if they have not adopted a majority voting policy.  This recommendation was updated to align the Guidelines with the TSX’s announcement on February 13, 2014 that uncontrolled … Continue Reading

Defensive Tools in Shareholder Activism: The “Voting Pill”

In today’s Financial Post,  Barbara Shecter highlighted the use of modified shareholder rights plans (colloquially known as “poison pills”) as an emerging defensive tool against opportunistic shareholder activism in Canada.  Traditionally, poison pills are used by boards of target companies as defensive tools to guard against unsolicited takeover bids.  By expanding the typical definition of “beneficial ownership” in a poison pill (which is typically limited to concepts of ownership and is used to determine whether the poison pill is triggered) by including securities that a shareholder does not own but has a right to vote or the right to … Continue Reading

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