Tag archives: ISS

Kingsdale Releases 2018 Proxy Season Review

Kingsdale Advisors has released its annual Proxy Season Review for 2018. The Review examines trends observed in 2018, predicts issues on the horizon, and provides advice to both issuers and activists in the marketplace.

In what follows, we pick out just a few of the important trends that emerge from Kingsdale’s analysis. The complete report can be viewed here.

Public activist activity remains healthy

Kingsdale counts 29 public proxy contests for the year to date. Though not reaching the high-water mark set in 2015 (55), the 29 public fights so far this year are up by 38%, as compared … Continue Reading

Ignoring board gender diversity is no longer an option

By Michael Viner (Toronto) on January 10, 2018 Posted in Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism

Discussions around board gender diversity are picking up steam in the lead up to the 2018 proxy season. Some of the leading proxy advisory firms, namely the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. LLC (Glass Lewis), appear to have caught wind of the discussions – both firms added a voting policy in respect of board gender diversity to their 2018 proxy voting guidelines for Canada.

The discussions around board gender diversity are not new. In late 2014 (and as reported on this blog), the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) published ‘comply or … Continue Reading

ISS releases 2018 Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates

By Joe Bricker on November 22, 2017 Posted in Compliance, Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism

On November 16, 2017, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) released its 2018 Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates (the Updates). These updates implement changes in a number of areas, with the most significant being a gender diversity policy and new criteria for determining when a director is “overboarded”. Except where indicated below, the changes are effective for meetings held on or after February 1, 2018.

Gender Diversity

The Updates implement ISS’s proposal, in its 2018 Benchmark Policy Consultation, to implement a gender diversity policy. For S&P/TSX Composite Index companies, ISS will generally recommend a withhold vote for … Continue Reading

Key takeaways from the first half of 2015

By Guy White on October 14, 2015 Posted in Securities

ISS’ preliminary postseason review for 2015 provides a report on U.S. activism trends in 2015. ISS identifies five key takeaways from the first half of 2015:

Proxy access proposals arrived in a big way this season, with almost 120 proposals and average votes in favour of 54.4% (a jump of more than 20 percentage points from 2014). A typical proposal grants shareholders who have held 3% of the company’s shares for 3 years the ability to include, in the company’s management proxy circular, nominees for up to 25 per cent of the board. As discussed in our previous posts by

Ontario Court Sheds New Light on Advance Notice Bylaws

By Saeed Teebi (Toronto) on July 7, 2014 Posted in Corporate Governance, Litigation, Proxy Battles, Shareholder Activism

In its recent decision in Orange Capital, LLC v Partners Real Estate Investment Trust, 2014 ONSC 3793, the Ontario Superior Court has offered new guidance on the interpretation of advance notice provisions used in the context of a proxy contest. The decision is another victory for Norton Rose Fulbright’s Special Situations team, which represented Orange Capital in this litigation.

In April 2014, Partners Real Estate Investment Trust (the REIT) announced that its annual and special meeting of unitholders (the Meeting) would be held on June 26, 2014. The REIT later postponed the Meeting to July 15, 2014. … Continue Reading

ISS pulls the “golden leash”, but has it gone too far?

By Saeed Teebi (Toronto) on February 3, 2014 Posted in Corporate Governance, Proxy Battles, Shareholder Activism

The most publicized proxy battle of 2013, Agrium Inc.’s showdown with activist US hedge fund Jana Partners, introduced the concept of the “golden leash” to the Canadian proxy scene. Jana nominated four independent directors to the board of Agrium, and offered to pay them, on top of their compensation as directors, a percentage of any profits Jana earns on its Agrium shares within a three year period. Agrium’s special committee of the board, represented by Norton Rose Fulbright, raised concerns with respect to this scheme eroding the independence of the Jana nominees by financially “leashing” them to Jana, thus incentivizing … Continue Reading