Tag archives: Overboarding

Overboard, under deliver?

We recently reported that Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) released its 2018 Americas Proxy Voting Guidelines Updates (the Policy Update), which, among other things, establishes modified guidelines for determining whether a director serving on the board of multiple public companies is “overboarded”.

Starting in 2019, ISS will recommend a withhold vote for (1) directors of TSX-listed companies who are CEOs and serve on two or more public boards and (2) any non-CEO director who serves on the board of five or more public companies.

Overboarding is a hot button topic in the realm of corporate governance. Questions arise … Continue Reading

Updates to ISS proxy voting guidelines

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is one of the leading proxy advisory firms that makes voting recommendations on public companies’ proxy resolutions. In Canada, ISS’ recommendations on transactions and governance issues can have a significant impact on many shareholders’ opinions, and particularly the opinions of institutional shareholders.

ISS publishes its proxy voting guidelines which explain the policies underlying its recommendations. For 2016, ISS updated certain items in guideline. The updates, as described below, are good indicators of investors’ views toward current issues in the corporate governance landscape.

Director Overboarding

In response to information about the average workload for directors … Continue Reading

ISS proposed proxy voting policy changes for 2016

Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), one of the world’s most influential proxy advisory firms, recently released its draft proposed voting policies for 2016.  ISS is currently requesting feedback on new or potential changes to three voting policies in Canada covering the following areas: director overboarding, compensation-related votes at externally-managed issuers and the introduction of an equity plan scoreboard.

Lowering the Threshold for Overboarding

ISS has recognized the risk in directors sitting on an excessive number of boards, such that directors become over-committed and unable to dedicate the required time and energy to each board necessary to effectively represent shareholders’ … Continue Reading

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